Paid for by the public: as electricity billpayers, and as taxpayers standing behind the loans.
This page sets out alternative paths at their documented costs, results and risks, from official figures, next to what was actually spent (the real cost). It does not recommend one.
Labels used: official = a government, regulator, court or audit-body document; filed = a company's own filed accounts; press = a company release or trade press; intergovernmental = an international agency; academic = a university explainer or paper; estimate = this site's arithmetic or an assumption, shown. Where a source says "not published", this page says so. Each figure keeps its own price year; none has been forced equal.
The UK and Norway offshore areas peaked at almost the same size: the UK at 4.49 million barrels of oil equivalent a day in 1999, Norway at 4.54 in 2004. Since then the two have moved apart. The tables below set out output, tax rates, the state's stake and state revenue, then what the regulators say about geology and policy.
| Measure | UK | Norway | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peak year and level | 4.49 (1999) | 4.54 (2004) | official (NSTA; Sodir via the Norwegian Ministry of Energy and Sodir site) |
| 2015 | 1.538 | 3.925 | official |
| 2025 | 1.094 | 4.122 | official |
| Change since 2015 | −28.9% | +5.0% | estimate |
| 2030 projection | 0.650 | 3.497 | official |
| 2040 projection | 0.218 | not published (no official figure found) | official |
UK is crude oil plus natural gas liquids plus net gas; Norway is marketable oil, condensate, liquids and gas. The two peaks differ by +1.1% (estimateLabels on the evidence register showing how strong a figure's source is: an official document, a press report, arithmetic, or an estimate. more ›). The UK 2040 figure rests on NSTA's stated decline-rate assumption, not a field-by-field forecast. Norway's regulator says its longer-term production level "is uncertain".
| Item | 2015 | 2022 | 2026 | Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UK, ring-fence corporation tax plus supplementary charge plus Energy Profits LevyA charge added to suppliers' costs, which they pass on in bills, to fund things like the Contracts for Difference subsidy. more › | 50% | 40%, then 65% from 26 May, 75% from 1 Jan 2023 | 78% | estimate (sum of stated rates); NSTA states 78% for 2026 |
| UK, Energy Profits Levy rate | none | 25% from 26 May 2022; 35% from 1 Jan 2023 | 38% from 1 Nov 2024 | official |
| Norway, ordinary tax plus special tax | 78% | 78% | 78% | estimate (sum of stated rates); Norway states 78% for each year |
The rates match in 2026 but are built differently. Norway's special tax falls on a cash-flow base, with capital spending deducted at once and the tax value of a loss reimbursed the next year. The UK levy is temporary by statute, with a stated end date of 31 March 2030 or earlier, and a successor levy is in draft. official
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Norway: direct state financial interest (SDFI) | 187 production licences, 48 producing fields | official |
| Norway: SDFI share of licensee cash flows, 2025 | 39% | official |
| Norway: state share of Equinor | 67% | official |
| Norway: oil fund market value, end 2025 | NOK 21,268bn (about £1,567bn at 13.572 NOK per £) | official; sterling figure estimate |
| UK: state stake in upstream oil and gas | none found | official (sources read) |
The UK line is a statement about what was found. It is not proof that no UK public body holds any interest. The National Wealth FundA UK government-owned investment body that can guarantee loans to infrastructure projects, backed by taxpayers. more › says it does not invest in oil and gas extraction, with very limited exemptions, and Great British Energy's statutory objects cover clean energy.
| Item | Figure | Price basis | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| Norway: state net cash flow from petroleum, 2024 | £58.3bn | Constant 2026 prices; NOK 742.8bn converted at 12.738 NOK per £ | estimate on official figures |
| Norway: of which taxes and fees | about £35bn | Constant 2026 prices | estimate |
| UK: total net revenue, fiscal year 2024-25 | £4.5bn (£4,469m) | Money of the day | official (HMRC) |
| Ratio, Norway to UK | 13 times | Mixed | estimate |
Price-basis caveat. The Norwegian series is in constant 2026 prices and the UK series is in money of the day, so the ratio is good to the nearest 10 to 20 per cent. As a check, Norway's 2015 figure in constant prices overstates its money-of-the-day figure by about 40%, and its 2025 figure by about 3%. estimate
No regulator quantifies how much of the output gap is due to geology and how much to policy. The sources hold no counterfactual, such as UK output under the Norwegian system. The regulators and governments describe maturity in their own words.
Reserves (the regulators' categories differ): Norway 13.6 billion barrels of oil equivalent, UK 2.9. official; Norway converted, estimate
This option keeps investing in UK offshore oil and gas, including areas west of Shetland. The figures below cover resources, the projected decline, falling capital spending, emissions against imported gas, the Energy Profits LevyA charge added to suppliers' costs, which they pass on in bills, to fund things like the Contracts for Difference subsidy. more ›, two field decisions, and one policy lever.
| Area | Measure | Billion barrels of oil equivalent | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| West of Shetland | Prospective, play-level, outside mapped leads and prospects, no cut-offs: P90, mean, P10 | 3.1, 4.7, 6.3 | official |
| West of Shetland | Prospective, mapped leads and prospects, with NSTA's cut-offs (30 million boe unrisked, 15% chance of success): P90, mean, P10 | 0.2, 0.7, 1.3 | official |
| Rockall Trough | Prospective, play-level, mean | 2.5 | official |
Prospective means undiscovered. These volumes are not reserves.
| Measure | 2025 actual | 2026 | 2040 projected | Class |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil, million barrels a day | 0.65 | 0.594 | 0.162 | official |
| Net gas, billion cubic feet a day | 2.574 | 2.396 | 0.325 | official |
UK gas production in 2025 was 332.1 TWh, "lowest level since 1973". official, DESNZ The UK peak for oil was 2.845 million barrels a day in 1999. official
| Year | Capital spending, £m | Exploration and appraisal, £m | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 4,071 | 535 | official (NSTA); price basis not stated (NSTA's projection table labels the same figures 2025 prices) |
| 2023 | 4,697 | 353 | official |
| 2024 | 5,703 | 209 | official |
| 2025 | 4,972 | 136 | official |
| 2026 to 2031, projected, £bn | 3.8, 3.2, 2.7, 2.23, 1.85, 1.68 | 0.235, 0.35, 0.136, 0.107, 0.107, 0.107 | official (NSTA, Feb 2026, 2025 prices) |
Capital spending is projected to fall to £1.68bn by 2031. No official source establishes cause and effect between the levy and the investment trend.
| Gas source | kgCO2e per barrel of oil equivalent | Class |
|---|---|---|
| UK domestic gas | 28 (18 upstream, 10 transport and processing) | official (NSTA, Sept 2025) |
| Imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) | 85 | official |
| Norwegian pipeline gas | 8 | official |
| Ratio, LNG to UK gas | about 3.0 (85 / 28 = 3.04) | estimate |
Combustion emissions are excluded. LNG made up 15% of UK gas supply and 46% of associated emissions in 2024. official The 2024 edition adds methane; the 2023 comparison covered carbon dioxide only, so the two are not strictly comparable.
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Rate | 25% (May 2022); 35% (Jan 2023); 38% (Nov 2024) | official |
| Receipts, 2022-23, 2023-24, 2024-25 | £2,632m; £3,587m; £2,857m | official (HMRC, Sept 2025) |
| Statutory end date | 31 March 2030, or earlier if prices stay at or below the thresholds | official |
| OBR assumption on the end | stops raising tax from the end of September 2027 | official (OBR, March 2026) |
| OBR receipts, £bn: 2024-25 outturn, then forecast to 2030-31 | 2.5, 2.5, 1.7, 0.9, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0 | official |
| Successor | Oil and Gas Revenue Levy, 35% on revenue above thresholds; draft legislation published 13 July 2026; thresholds not in the files read | official |
HMRC's manual page still shows a 35% rate and an end date of 31 March 2028; its overview page and NSTA show 38% and 31 March 2030, which are used here.
| Item | Rosebank | Jackdaw | Class |
|---|---|---|---|
| Application status | Under Review (page last updated 16 July 2026) | Under Review (page last updated 14 September 2026) | official |
| Consents | Court of Session, 29 January 2025: "All parties are agreed that the decisions were unlawful". The consents were reduced, with the effect suspended until a new decision. | official (court) | |
| Decision | Not decided. The government says it will decide "as soon as we can". | press (Energy Voice, 24 Sep 2026) | |
| Lifetime emissions assessed | 254 MtCO2e | 35.8 MtCO2e (2026 to 2037) | developer's figures given to OPRED: Rosebank Oct 2025, its high (P10) case, the developer's most likely case about 30% lower; Jackdaw Nov 2025, its highest-production case (scope 3 emissions) |
| Size and output | "estimated 300mn recoverable bbls" (a passing remark, not a reserves statement); floating production vessel oil capacity 70,000 barrels a day | About 6.5% of UK Continental Shelf gas production at peak | official (developer's submissions to OPRED) |
| Capital cost | not published (redacted) | over £1bn invested to date | official (developer's submission) |
| Economic claim | Total gross value added £24.3bn over the field's life, £0.8bn a year on average | n/a | official (developer's submission, not a government finding) |
Western Australia reserves part of its gas for its own market. The rule fixes a volume. It does not fix a price.
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Reservation | 15% of LNG exports reserved for the Western Australian market; policy formalised in 2006 | official (WA Government, updated 10 Jun 2026) |
| How it is measured | Over the life of the project or agreement, not each year. Prices are set by market participants through confidential negotiation. | official |
| 2024 change for new onshore projects | 80% reserved to 31 December 2030 | official |
| Compliance with the 15% | not published in any source read | n/a |
| Western Australia, average contract priceThe fixed price per unit of electricity that a wind farm is guaranteed under its subsidy contract. more ›, Q2 2025 | A$7.37/GJ (A$7.29/GJ in Q2 2024); the data "may only include a subset" of sales | official (AEMO, Dec 2025) |
| East coast: the Australian Government review, Dec 2025 | "could establish a domestic gas reservation scheme"; aim to commence in 2027 | official |
The Western Australian price is an average contract price in a series that "may only include a subset" of sales, in Australian dollars per gigajoule. A comparison with east-coast prices is not shown: the Australian competition regulator's report could not be obtained in a way that respects its access rules. No source attributes any price gap to the reservation alone.
For the UK: no UK assessment of a gas reservation was found in searches of gov.uk, DESNZThe UK government department responsible for energy policy, including subsidy auctions and community fund guidance. more ›, NSTA, OfgemThe UK government regulator for gas and electricity, which sets how much network companies can charge billpayers. more ›, the NAO, the CMA, the CCC, select committees and petitions. Hansard and the Commons Library were blocked and not read. A government reply to a petition on licences (17 July 2025) says "domestically produced oil and gas does not mean cheaper prices". official Any UK cost, volume or price effect of a reservation is not published.
This option pairs gas generation with capture and storage of the carbon dioxide. The government has committed £21.7bn over 25 years to the first two clusters. The generation cost sits close to offshore wind in the government's own table, and the National Audit Office has set out the delivery risks.
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Track-1 funding commitment, 4 October 2024 | £21.7bn over 25 years, for the clusters in the North West and North East of England | official (DESNZ) |
| Gas with carbon capture, levelised cost, 2030 | £105/MWh (2024 prices, 900 MW plant, 88% load factor) | official (DESNZ) |
| FixedLabels on the evidence register showing whether a figure's source was checked and confirmed, corrected, missing, or wrong. more › offshore wind, same table, 2030 | £103/MWh (2024 prices) | official (DESNZ) |
| Gas with carbon capture, 2035 | £104/MWh | official |
| Gas without capture, 93% load factor, 2030 | £111/MWh, of which carbon cost £41/MWh | official |
| Track-1 storage ambition | 8.5 Mt of CO2 a year (two clusters) | press (trade press, 4 Oct 2024) |
| Amount DESNZThe UK government department responsible for energy policy, including subsidy auctions and community fund guidance. more › expected Track-1 emitters to capture | at most 4.9 Mt a year | official (NAO, July 2024) |
| Spent to mid-2024 | £630m, mainly development grants | official (NAO) |
| Cost per tonne of CO2 stored under the Track-1 contracts | not published | n/a |
The wind figure excludes connection costs, which the DESNZ table includes for other technologies. DESNZ calls gas with capture "a nascent generation technology in the UK". The 2030 and 2035 figures use the 2020 report for all cost components other than the capital cost of gas with capture, which is new in 2025.
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Size in the application | up to 910 MW, gas with post-combustion capture | official (Scottish Government Energy Consents Unit) |
| Consent status, checked 5 October 2026 | "Consideration"; application received 18 February 2022, so about 4 years 7 months undecided | official; the elapsed time is an estimate |
| Funding | No funding decision. A "programme of funded development work" is still to be agreed. | filed (SSE annual report, FY2026) |
| Capture rate | not stated for Peterhead; SSE's project page says carbon capture technology "can capture at least 90%" | press (project page, general description) |
| Capital cost and consumer subsidy | not published | n/a |
| Acorn (Scottish Cluster), June 2025 | Development funding of around £200m, "subject to business case"; the Spending Review says a final investment decision will be taken "later this Parliament". The Spending Review text gives no figure; the £200m is stated in a DESNZ release of 19 June 2025. | official (DESNZ release, 19 June 2025; Spending Review) |
"DESNZ will struggle to achieve its 2030 ambitions for carbon capture"
official · NAO, carbon capture, usage and storage programme, July 2024
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Theoretical capacity, UK seabed, P50 | 78 Gt of CO2, mostly saline aquifers | official (BGS, 2014 paper; repeated by NSTA, Dec 2024) |
| BGS web page | "over 70 billion tonnes" | official |
| First permit, Endurance | up to 100 Mt over 25 years; 4 Mt a year injection rate; first injection by 2027 | official (NSTA) |
| Other licences, Dec 2024 | 26 appraisal and storage licences | official (NSTA) |
| Theoretical against practical capacity | not published | n/a |
The 78 Gt is a static theoretical figure, not an injectable rate or a permitted volume.
This option would produce gas from UK shale. The official estimateLabels on the evidence register showing how strong a figure's source is: an official document, a press report, arithmetic, or an estimate. more › of gas in place is large, and the official position is that the recoverable share cannot be estimated. No official capital or production cost for UK shale was found.
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Bowland-Hodder gas in place, 2013: low, central, high | 822, 1,329, 2,281 tcf (23.3, 37.6, 64.6 tcm) | official (BGS/DECC) |
| Recoverable | "a reliable estimate of recoverable shale gas cannot be made at this time" | official (BGS/DECC) |
| Only official figures for what could be produced (2010, Upper Bowland only) | 2.1 tcf (about 59 bcm) on an analogy with the Antrim Shale, or up to 4.7 tcf (133 bcm) on an analogy with the Barnett Shale of Texas | official (quoted in the 2013 report); the 59 bcm is computed |
| Scale of those figures | about 2 to 4 years of 2025 UK gas production (332.1 TWh) | estimate |
| BGS, 2019 | Resources "could be much lower than first thought"; the study used "a very small number of rock samples from only two locations" | official |
| BGS review for government, September 2022 | Gas present "may be significantly lower and spatially more restricted than initially estimated" | official |
| A later gas-in-place number | about 4.0 tcm (2019 analysis) | academic (LSE explainer citing BGS; BGS's own statement gives no number) |
| Capital or production cost | not published | n/a |
tcf = trillion cubic feet; tcm = trillion cubic metres; bcm = billion cubic metres. The 2.1 and 4.7 tcf figures are one-unit analogies, not forecasts. No BGS review of the gas-in-place figure after 2022 was found.
| Date | Event | Class |
|---|---|---|
| 2 November 2019 | Immediate moratorium. First reason given: it is "not currently possible to accurately predict the probability or magnitude of earthquakes linked to fracking operations". Second: a magnitude 2.9 event recorded on 26 August 2019 at Preston New Road. | official (BEIS and OGA) |
| 22 September 2022 | Moratorium lifted. Future applications to be considered "with the domestic and global need for gas in mind and where there is local support". | official (BEIS) |
| 26 October 2022 | Re-imposed, citing the 2019 manifesto. This rests on trade press; no official text was found, because the Parliament sites returned HTTP 403 and were not circumvented. | press (Ground Engineering) |
| April 2026 | "the Labour Government has maintained this moratorium" | official (legislature research service) |
This option builds the same reactor design repeatedly. Project costs for Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C are on the nuclear page. This section covers only the evidence on whether repeat building lowers cost. The evidence points both ways.
"SZC's project baseline construction cost is 22% lower than the lowest current estimateLabels on the evidence register showing how strong a figure's source is: an official document, a press report, arithmetic, or an estimate. more › for HPC"
official · NAO, Sizewell C, HC 33, 20 May 2026
The 22% excludes some costs in the regulatory thresholds, the main one being a £1.6bn payment to Hinkley Point C. The Sizewell C project baseline is £38.2bn. official (NAO)
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Evidence pointing to lower cost | ||
| Design replicated at Sizewell C | around 85% of the above-ground design | official (NAO) |
| Sizewell C against Hinkley Point C, cost per kW | about £11,650 against about £15,000 (22.5% lower) | estimate (£38.2bn over 3,278 MW; £49.0bn, itself an estimate, over 3,260 MW) |
| Pairs of reactors | second reactor about 15% cheaper | intergovernmental (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, July 2020) |
| Series construction | total costs "25-40% lower" | intergovernmental (NEA) |
| Barakah, UAE, units 1 to 4 | costs fell more than 50% between the first and fourth units | intergovernmental (NEA citing a 2019 database study; not a primary cost series) |
| France, second pair on a site against the first, cost per MWUnits of electrical power (MW) and energy (MWh, GWh): power is a rate, energy is power delivered over time. more › | 31% lower (Tricastin), 24% (Paluel), 20% (Cattenom) | estimate on official figures (Cour des comptes, Jan 2012, from EDF data) |
| Evidence pointing to higher cost, or to no fall | ||
| France, national series, cost per MW in 2010 euros | €1.07m (1978, Fessenheim) to €2.06m (2000, Chooz) or €1.37m (2002, Civaux); average €1.25m for 58 reactors | official (Cour des comptes) |
| Cause given for the French rise | "notamment du fait de l'application de règlementations plus contraignantes" (stricter safety rules) | official (Cour des comptes) |
| Shin Kori 3 and 4, Korea, announced against ex-post cost | US$1,828/kWe against US$2,410/kWe; about 32% over (2,410 / 1,828 = 1.32) | intergovernmental (NEA); overrun is an estimate |
| Korean cost data | The only country where overnight costs "appear to decline over time in the modern era is South Korea", but the data "do not come from an independent source" | academic (reply to a peer-reviewed paper, 2016 draft) |
| US study, 2020 | Building subsequent plants on an existing design "costs more, not less" | press (university press release; the paper was not obtained) |
| Delay between UK units | Could reduce "the benefit from replicating HPC" | official (NAO) |
The NEA table lists the Korean figures next to Vogtle 3 and 4 at US$4,300 to 8,600 and Flamanville 3 at US$1,886 to 8,620, so Korean costs were lower than Western ones even though they rose against budget. The French reading: costs fell between paired units on one site and for follow-on units, and rose across the national series as safety rules tightened.
What the UK government says. DESNZThe UK government department responsible for energy policy, including subsidy auctions and community fund guidance. more › states the benefit as reduced risk of time and cost overruns, not as a quantified fall. A UK percentage cost fall from a fleet of identical reactors is not published. The Nuclear Regulatory Review summary (24 November 2025) says the UK "has become the most expensive place in the world to build nuclear projects". official
This option lowers electricity costs for the heaviest industrial users. UK large users pay the most in the comparison group. The figures below cover prices, the support already in place, and the steel industry.
Users of 20,000 to 69,999 MWhUnits of electrical power (MW) and energy (MWh, GWh): power is a rate, energy is power delivered over time. more › a year, annual average, pence per kWh. Comparison group: the EU14 plus the UK. official, DESNZ Quarterly Energy Prices, 28 May 2026
| Country | p/kWh |
|---|---|
| United Kingdom (rank 15 of 15) | 24.35 |
| Ireland | 17.74 |
| Italy | 14.14 |
| Germany | 13.62 |
| Netherlands | 11.04 |
| Spain | 9.41 |
| France | 7.91 |
| Sweden | 5.95 |
| EU14 plus UK median | 11.04 |
The UK is 120% above the median. official, DESNZ Excluding taxes, large users: UK 17.98 against a median of 9.93, 81% above. Medium users including taxes: UK 25.85 against 13.83, 87% above. DESNZThe UK government department responsible for energy policy, including subsidy auctions and community fund guidance. more ›'s June 2026 headline: prices "were highest in the UK compared with the EU14 plus UK". For industrial gas the picture differs: the UK had the eleventh lowest price of 24 in the IEA group in 2024. official A comparison with the G7 and other non-EU countries for 2025 is not published in the current DESNZ tables.
| Item | Value | Class |
|---|---|---|
| Network charging compensation, 60% to 90% from 1 April 2026 | £310m to £420m a year (2025 prices) | official (DBT) |
| Supercharger, April 2026 | "a £420 million boost for around 500 of the UK's most energy-intensive businesses"; latest wording (1 October 2026) "over £400 million per year" | official (gov.uk) |
| British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme, eligibility widened from 7,000 to over 10,000 businesses | up to £600m a year from April 2027 | official (gov.uk, 15 Apr 2026) |
| Existing exemption scheme | around £400m a year; cost met by other consumers, £4 to £6 a year on a household bill | official (DBT impact assessment, Jan 2024) |
| Effect on steel electricity prices | £168/MWh to £86/MWh on average; about £40 a tonne for electric arc furnaces | official (DBT Steel Strategy, 20 Mar 2026) |
| Net present social value of the Supercharger package | £9.4bn (2020 prices, 10-year appraisal) | official (DBT); a social value, not a subsidy cost |
| Total package value | not published | n/a |
The only "£2bn" figure found is a historical total: "More than £2 billion since 2013" (gov.uk, 2023). The cost of bringing UK prices to the EU median is not published.
| Item | Figure | Class |
|---|---|---|
| UK crude steel output | 10.9 Mt (2015); 5.6 Mt (2023); 4.0 Mt (2024); 2.6 Mt (2025) | official (2015 and 2024, DBT); press (worldsteel, 2023 and 2025) |
| 2025 against 2015 | 76% lower (2.6 / 10.9 = 0.24) | estimate |
| Causes named in the Steel Strategy | "global overcapacity compounded by high operating costs", including "high electricity and labour costs" | official (DBT) |
| Share of the decline due to energy cost | not published | n/a |
| Public money on steel | about £350m anticipated to acquire Speciality Steel UK (four sites) | official (four sites, DBT); press report of a ministerial statement (£350m) |
No document read separates energy cost from overcapacity, imports and the end of blast-furnace sites. An official aluminium output series was not foundLabels on the evidence register showing whether a figure's source was checked and confirmed, corrected, missing, or wrong. more ›; the only source read is a 2012 think-tank paper. press The Scottish Government has given a 25-year guarantee on the hydro supply to the Lochaber smelter, from December 2016. official (Scottish Parliament paper, Feb 2026)
The government names carbon leakage as a risk and says it "is committed to tackling" it. A UK Carbon Border Adjustment Measure starts on 1 January 2027. Options on export leakage are still being assessed, and indirect emissions are in scope "delayed until 2029 at the earliest". official, DBT and HM Treasury
Project research files: research/ALTERNATIVE-OPTIONS.md, compiled 5 October 2026 (main source); research/UK-NORWAY-OIL-GAS.md, prepared 5 October 2026; research/NUCLEAR-COMPARISON.md, compiled 5 October 2026; research/SOVEREIGN-BRIEFING-REVIEW.md, Addendum 3, 16 September 2026. PrimaryLabels on the evidence register showing how strong a figure's source is: an official document, a press report, arithmetic, or an estimate. more › sources behind them: DESNZThe UK government department responsible for energy policy, including subsidy auctions and community fund guidance. more › Electricity Generation Costs 2025; NAO, carbon capture, usage and storage programme, July 2024; NAO, Sizewell C (HC 33), 20 May 2026; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, reducing the cost of nuclear construction, July 2020; Cour des comptes, nuclear sector report, January 2012; NSTA Reserves and Resources, end 2024; NSTA production and medium-term projections, February 2026; NSTA emissions intensity factsheet, September 2025; OBR Economic and fiscal outlook, March 2026; HMRC government revenues from oil and gas production, September 2025; BGS/DECC Bowland shale gas report, 2013; BEIS and OGA, 2 November 2019; BEIS, 22 September 2022; DESNZ Quarterly Energy Prices, 28 May 2026; DBT Steel Strategy, 20 March 2026; gov.uk announcements of 15 April 2026 and 1 October 2026; DBT impact assessment, January 2024; Western Australian Government, domestic gas policy, updated 10 June 2026; AEMO, December 2025; Australian Government Gas Market Review, December 2025. Also used: Court of Session judgment [2025] CSOH 10, 29 January 2025; the Rosebank and Jackdaw developers' submissions to OPRED; Energy Voice, 24 September 2026; the Scottish Government Energy Consents Unit record for Peterhead; SSE annual report, FY2026; SSE Thermal's Peterhead project page; DESNZ release, 19 June 2025; BGS statement, August 2019, and BGS review for government, 2022; LSE Grantham Institute shale explainer; Ground Engineering, November 2022; Northern Ireland Assembly research paper, April 2026; worldsteel, World Steel in Figures 2025 and 2026; Nuclear Regulatory Review summary, 24 November 2025; DESNZ DUKES 2026 chapter 4 and UK Energy in Brief 2026; DBT release, 18 July 2025; a PA report of 14 September 2026 on Speciality Steel UK; ECB euro reference exchange rates. Norwegian figures come through the Norwegian petroleum site run jointly by the Ministry of Energy and Sodir, because the regulator's own site blocked plain requests. The Gas Market Review and a Western Australian Parliament committee report were read from Internet Archive copies; the content is treated as the official text but the route is flagged. Not published or not foundLabels on the evidence register showing whether a figure's source was checked and confirmed, corrected, missing, or wrong. more ›: Peterhead capital cost and subsidy, cost per tonne stored under the Track-1 contracts, Rosebank capital cost, a UK fleet cost for nuclear, a UK assessment of gas reservation, a G7 industrial price comparison, an official aluminium output series, and the share of steel decline due to energy cost. Related pages: the real cost, nuclear, risk and return, money leaving the UK.